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THE EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT OF THE 
EUROZONE 
THE SHAPING OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
Executive Summary 
•  Capital markets have undergone massive changes in the past decade; in Western 
Europe but of course more fundamentally in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC). 
•  The euro has fostered the transformation of financial systems toward a more market 
based approach. Its impact in Eastern Europe will be even stronger. 
•  To ensure the success of EMU an active and open-market stance is required. The 
euro increases the cost of failure and thus provides a strong incentive to comply. 
•  Repercussion to current members will be stronger, hence, they will not allow any 
substantial deviation from the consensus economic policy.  
•  A common currency fosters capital market integration—ie, liberalisation, deregulation, 
and consolidation of financial services throughout the currency area. Competition 
increases and will lead to higher efficiency.  
•  More efficient financial markets improve the allocation of capital and hence contribute 
to long-term growth and prosperity. The main vehicle is more and better investments. 
•  In the short run it will be important to avoid imbalances which might destabilise the 
CEE applicant states 
•  Capital inflows to the CEEC might overshoot a sustainable level and be channelled 
into unprofitable investments. Eventually this money may be withdrawn all of a 
sudden undershooting the long-term level and depriving the applicant states of 
financial resources and leading to crisis. 
•  A prudent treatment of these flows requires a developed capital market, something 
the CEEC are only about to acquire. Hence, special attention should be given to the 
evolution of financial institutions and a sufficient regulatory framework. Applicant 
states should use foreign capital flows to promote capital market development—eg, in 
the form of foreign entry of banks. 
•  The adoption of the acquis communautaire and the Stability Pact provides a tested 
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•  Capital markets have undergone massive changes in the past decade; in Western Europe but of 
course more fundamentally in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). 
•  The euro has fostered the transformation of financial systems toward a more market based 
approach. Its impact in Eastern Europe will be even stronger. 
•  To ensure the success of EMU an active and open-market stance is required. The euro increases 
the cost of failure and thus provides a strong incentive to comply. 
•  Repercussion to current members will be stronger, hence, they will not allow any substantial 
deviation from the consensus economic policy.  
•  A common currency fosters capital market integration—ie, liberalisation, deregulation, and 
consolidation of financial services throughout the currency area. Competition increases and will 
lead to higher efficiency.  
•  More efficient financial markets improve the allocation of capital and hence contribute to long-
term growth and prosperity. The main vehicle is more and better investments. 
•  In the short run it will be important to avoid imbalances which might destabilise the CEE 
applicant states 
•  Capital inflows to the CEEC might overshoot a sustainable level and be channelled into 
unprofitable investments. Eventually this money may be withdrawn all of a sudden undershooting 
the long-term level and depriving the applicant states of financial resources and leading to crisis. 
•  A prudent treatment of these flows requires a developed capital market, something the CEEC 
are only about to acquire. Hence, special attention should be given to the evolution of financial 
institutions and a sufficient regulatory framework. Applicant states should use foreign capital 
flows to promote capital market development—eg, in the form of foreign entry of banks. 
•  The adoption of the acquis communautaire and the Stability Pact provides a tested institutional 
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1  Introduction 
Ten countries are about to join the European Union (EU), perhaps as early as 2004, including 
Malta (if public support can be restored), Cyprus (if the political/geographical problem can be 
tackled) and some eight central and eastern European countries (CEEC) which are the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic but not 
Romania and Bulgaria—in general both are considered not to be ripe for accession.  
Shortly after, and perhaps just two years after joining the EU, these countries will adopt the euro 
as legal tender and will become part of the European System of Central Bank—which includes 
voting rights with the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. European Monetary 
Unification (EMU) as of 1999 has provoked a lot of academic (and not so academic) discussion 
on the pros and cons of a joint currency, usually starting with Mundell’s optimum currency area 
arguments (Mundell 1961)—which eventually awarded him the Nobel prize in the very same 
year. The trade-off is seen between the advantages of economic integration—ie, enhanced cross-
border allocation of resources which should lead to more efficiency—and the loss of flexibility in 
economic policy in terms of monetary autonomy and exchange-rate variations. When the benefits 
of integration are low; a high probability of asymmetric shocks renders the need for economic 
discretion very valuable, and  other means of flexibility, mainly in the form of fast price 
adjustments, migration, or fiscal transfers, are missing, the verdict is returned against a common 
currency.  
Apart from that rather static point of view, the notion has been pronounced that EMU itself 
might change some of those issues. Given that economic policy is constrained, and that flexibility 
might be needed, which markets are not yet providing, than that latter fact might change. 
Economic actors might realise, for instance, that a currency devaluation, an expansive monetary 
policy, or a substantial fiscal stimulus will not become available and react by creating more 
flexibility themselves. Markets reshape when confronted with changing constraints. Market forces 
might coerce public authorities to accommodate this process (cf Bolle and Neugart 2000).  
Capital markets are a prominent part of the economic system and obviously strongly affected by 
monetary integration. Costs of cross-border transactions dwarf as currency risk (vis-à-vis the 
euro) vanishes and other de jure and de facto barriers to international mobility of financial flows will 
be eliminated. Previously segmented markets become more integrated, exposing less efficient 
usages of funds and starting a reallocation. The resulting process of restructuring includes a 
considerable amount of creative destruction and will leave winners and losers in both, the applicant 
states as well as in the current eurozone. Prospective losers might lobby against restructuring, and 
part of the success of enlargement will depend on how will be dealt with potential losers—ie, 
whether they will be ignored, compensated, or allowed to block a process that otherwise might   6
yield economic advantages for a majority. In that sense eastward enlargement is not Pareto-
efficient, however, given that prosperity will grow, resources will be created that might suffice to 
compensate legitimate claims of potentially disadvantaged.   
 
Capital markets comprise more than financial systems and foreign direct investments. They 
include all productive resources that are not labour, but are priced and traded in an organised 
way. The financial system is a key element in that respect because here pricing and trading takes 
place in market institutions which are explicitly set up—such as stock exchanges—or at least 
follow an institutionalised pattern, for instance bank financing. Evidently, the institutional 
framework plays an important role, in particular with regard to ensuring property rights and 
enforcing the rules of the game. Financial development and economic growth are increasingly 
perceived to be complementary (Levine, 1997). Financial institutions provide a number of 
important services such as trading, hedging, allocation of capital, screening, and monitoring. 
Financial development may even enhance the domestic savings rate (Pagano, 1993). Indeed, a 
strong correlation of financial and economic development has been found in influential studies 
such as King and Levine (1993). 
 
This paper aims to analyse most likely effects of an eastward enlargement of the eurozone on 
capital markets in the CEE applicants, and to a lesser degree in the current eurozone. It is part of 
an international research project, ezoneplus, which is supported by the European Commission in 
the 5
th framework programme. Other reports focus on trade and foreign direct investments, 
labour markets, and exchange-rate regimes, so that corresponding issues are omitted here. The 
division is of course delicate and overlaps might be inevitable. Moreover, previous work has 
explored theoretical arguments (Meyer 2001) and provided an empirical background (Meyer 
2002, Vieira and Vieira 2002, Lavrac 2002, Kiander 2002, Marzo 2002). Hence, this paper sums 
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2   Agenda ahead 
 
2.1   EU and EMU 
In Gothenburg the current members of the European Union envisaged to include the CEE 
applicants by 2004—albeit no binding commitment has been made. However, the most likely 
scenario seems to be an accession of ten applicants, including Malta and Cyprus but without 
Bulgaria and Romania, somewhat around 2004 or shortly after. Though it might be favourable to 
include only a smaller number of the most advanced countries in a first round (cf. Eichengreen 
and Ghironi 2001), the political cost of disappointing those who remain outside seem to be too 
high. 
In contrast to the current EU members there will be no opt-out clause for EMU granted to 
future participants—ie, those who join the EU are expected to join EMU as well, as soon as the 
Maastricht criteria are fulfilled. One condition laid down in the Maastricht treaty requires 
participation in the successor of the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM), now dubbed 
ERM2, for a minimum period of two years without realignment. Consequently, most prospective 
members plan the adoption of the euro within two years after joining the EU (European 
Commission 2001). By then, future EMU members will not only have adopted the acquis 
communautaire and have fulfilled the Amsterdam conditions, both necessary to join the EU, but 
will also have complied to the Maastricht criteria and will be subject to the regulation of the 
Stability Pact.  
The Maastricht criteria require convergence of a number of nominal variables to EU levels, such 
as, inflation, exchange rates, and long-term interest rates, as well as the two notorious fiscal 
criteria which set an upper limit for budget deficits of 3 percent of GDP and a maximum of 60 
percent of GDP to total indebtedness. The Stability Pact extends the 3 percent constraint into 
the future and includes levies in case of non-compliance, subject to the approval of the council of 
EU-ministers. The acquis communautaire represents the sum of EU legislation and includes such 
juicy pieces as the common agricultural policy. With regard to financial markets and banking it 
includes a wealth of regulation ranging from capital account liberalisation (Capital Liberalisation 
Directive) to deposit insurance of at least €20k per customer (deposit protection). In many 
respects, these joint standards create a level playing field for financial transactions in a then 
enlarged eurozone which will improve market efficiency. However, the transition may prove to 
be painful for some CEE financial institutions, in particular the many banking directives which 
increase European competition and may put a strain on very small banks (cf Wagner and Iakova 
2001).    8
Accessions to the EU and to the eurozone share a lot of commonalities. But joining the euro will 
add a new quality to the process of European integration for the CEE applicants, just as it did for 
the current members. The reason lies with the growing dependencies in the economic 
development of participants. Sharing a currency means sharing an inflation rate—at least to some 
extent. The European Central Bank (ECB) determines a common interest rate which might be 
too high for some countries and too low for others, given differences in the financial systems and 
business cycles. CEE applicants are economically small and should have only a minor impact on 
European inflation—in normal circumstances. A financial crisis in CEE might lead to the 
expectation of an ECB bail-out, moreover the national branches of the ECB may act 
independently as a lender of last resort and increase money supply. The accession countries will 
also get their say in the ECB board of directors and participate in the decision-making process 
and probably opt for a more convenient—ie, expansionary—monetary policy. Whether or not 
they will get away with it seems rather unclear. Anyhow, the worse economic conditions become 
in CEE the more explicit and implicit pressure will current members and the ECB feel to assist—
for instance because standard tools such as exchange rate realignments or sovereign monetary 
policy ceased to exist. The cost of economic distress in the CEEC can be partly exported to the 
present eurozone which increases the incentive on both sides to prevent it in the first place.  
The current euro-members have a vested interest in the stability and prosperity of the joining 
countries in CEE. The cost of economic failure would be magnified by the euro and part of it 
would be transferred to the present eurozone. In order to rule out failure, the eurozone will insist 
on a sound macroeconomic policy and the enforcement of the acquis. The detection of non-
compliance, however, is a tricky task burdened with political considerations. But given the linkage 
created by the euro, the rigor with which acquis and macroeconomic austerity will be enforced 
(coerced) should be much stronger. For instance, chances should become slim that deviations 
from the acquis—in particular in the day-to-day application—would be tolerated for political 
reasons.  
The commitment of the EU towards its prospective members becomes more credible with the 
euro and hence shapes market sentiment toward an expectation of stable and growing CEE 
applicants. This credibility lowers the real cost of stabilisation. A caveat might be that the current 
EU values stability in the CEEC higher than prosperity, relative to the applicant’s preferences—
ie, the EU is more risk-averse, because it might share the cost of failure rather than the fruits of 
strong growth. However, given the high cost of buying macroeconomic credibility without a 
strong anchor and the tremendous advantages of a sound institutional framework the price of 
staying too prudent seems rather modest.  
   9
2.2   Financial development and EMU 
Since 1999, the time when the first countries joined the EMU, capital markets in the eurozone 
have undergone massive changes. Though it is to acknowledge that capital markets are changing 
anyway—due to advances in research and technology, transforming investment patterns, 
corporate restructuring, just to mention a few—it can be argued that the euro is strengthening 
and precipitating this process.   
Economies of scale render integrated capital markets more efficient by two respects. First, price 
volatility will sink because more supply meets more demand, regional imbalances are mitigated on 
the European level. Reduced price volatility means less liquidity risk and thus lower cost of 
capital. Moreover, an integrated financial market sets a level playing field with regard to 
regulation and institutions, for instance in the form of the acquis communautaire, which lowers 
transaction costs. The potentially biggest advantage stems from increased competition for funds 
on a European level. Capital market integration, by definition, means the removal of market 
segmentation. The latter sometimes provides a cosy resort for less profitable investments only 
because outside options were missing. In a bigger market lenders may eventually find a more 
lucrative asset; borrowers a cheaper source of financing. Less lucrative investments and expensive 
financing will be driven out of the market.  
Studies, such as Danthine et al. (2000), and Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001), have shown that EMU 
spurs the trends toward a unified capital market with the beneficiary effects described above: 
While market size increases, the euro-market is bigger than the sum of the previously separated 
national capital markets, liquidity and fundamental risk is reduced.  Hardouvelis et al. (1999) 
estimate a reduction of 2% in the cost of capital due to the process of European integration 1992 
- 1998. Moreover, the standardised expression of prices in euro and the creation of a euro-wide 
yield curve as a benchmark improves market efficiency (Danthine et al. 2000). Thanks to the 
bigger European market, the a verage size of bond issues has increased. With the euro’s 
introduction average corporate bonds issue value $400m, up from just $200m the year before. 
Government issues now seem to exceed a minimum of €5bn-€20bn if they aim for a benchmark 
issue (cf Santillán et al. 2000). 
The removal of segmentation can be exemplified with European equity markets where 
movements in price indices have become more and more in line. For instance the correlation of 
the main German index, the DAX, and the main French one, the CAC 40, has increased from .63 
(1993-1996) to .83 (1997-2000). Table 2.2.1 shows the correlations for the two periods for most 
European stock exchanges. 
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Table 2.2.1 
Correlation coefficients between weekly variations of stock exchange indices, 1993-1996 


























































Correlation coefficients between weekly variations of stock exchange indices, 1997-2000 

























































Source: Banco de Portugal, Relatório do Conselho de Administração 2001 
 
Table 2.2.1 shows increased correlations for the movements of all major European stock 
exchanges. The removal of market segmentation gave capital markets throughout the eurozone 
more clout. Financing slowly turns from a traditional bank-based system at least to some extent 
toward a more open-market approach. Banks still increased their business (see table 2.2.2) but 
changes are visible. Germany’s banking system has experienced much pressure which initialised 
some restructuring, in particular the disentangling of banks and firms. Though convenient for 
many business-leaders, this structure has proved to be an obstacle in international competition 
and an integrating capital market makes such disadvantages more apparent. Creation of   11
shareholder value has become more prominent since more people own stocks and exit options—
within and outside Europe—have become cheaper (cf Meyer 2002).  
 
Table 2.2.2 
    Belgium  France  Germany  Netherlands  USA 
1990  70,3  104,4  105,4  103,0  110,9  Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector (%GDP)  1999  147,3  102,2  145,2  126,8  164,2 
World Development Indicators 2001 
 
Fixed incomes have been the biggest success in the still young euro-history. Bonds emissions 
have soared with the introduction of the joint currency (figure 2.2.1), though some technical 
considerations played a role. The subsequent decline in US$-terms has to take into account the 
considerable depreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the greenback. More interesting than the amounts 
is the composition of the bonds markets: Corporate bonds are on the rise; in Germany their 
share multiplied by nearly twenty, albeit from a very small level. Corporate bonds are of particular 
importance because they (i) are an alternative to bank lending, and (ii) indicate the functioning of 
the financial system, because bonds-holders can enforce their property rights only in a stable and 
reliable institutional setting (cf Meyer 2002).  
The euro increases international mobility of capital by (i) lowering the cost of international 
transactions, (ii) reducing de facto barriers to international operations, and (iii) helping to enforce 
the  de jure liberalisation of the capital account—ie, mainly the enforcement of the acquis 
communautaire. An integrated European financial market increases the efficiency of c apital 
allocation, which strengthens an ongoing process of restructuring in corporate and public 
Europe. International mergers and acquisitions are eased as financing them has become more and 
more possible at lower cost. Tremendous amounts of money—such as for the expensive G3 
telecom-licenses—could be raised on European capital markets. Institutions and legislation is 
following market pressure: European stock-exchanges, though still very much a matter of 
national pride, are increasingly collaborating in order to realise the economies of scale so much 
needed in financial markets. And there is still much to make up in comparison to the biggest and 
most liquid trading floors in the US (see table 2.2.3). The latest sign of increased competition is 
the intrusion of Nasdaq into the European market with the foundation of Nasdaq Germany 
jointly with the stock-exchanges of Berlin and Bremen—both very small regional exchanges 
struggling for survival. 
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Figure 2.2.1  
France: domestic debt securities






















Germany: domestic debt securities



















USA: domestic debt securities 
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Differences in regulation are an often quoted impediment to capital market integration in 
Europe. Standards, practises, and law deviate from each other within the eurozone—and with 
regard to other financial centres, mainly London and the US. Particularities in domestic 
regulation can become a problem because they increase information costs of investors, which 
have to know and assess the differences, and may be rewarded by a discount on domestic asset. 
Hence, the current trend toward a unified regulation, respectively the attempts to explain the 
benefits of some particularities (“comply or explain”). The quality of institutions are an important 
Bank for International Settlement, 2002   13
determinant of investment decisions. Members of the eurozone have felt the increasing pressure 
to modernise their financial regulation. In Germany, a new code on corporate governance has 
just (February 2002) been published, which is a good example. Though not a formal law, and 
thus no formal sanction in case of non-compliance, German firms may face a discount on the 
capital market if they deviate from this standard without an appropriate explanation. Hence, 
enforcement is given to the capital market, which may be more efficient than a public authority. 
Note, however, that it needed some public impulse to create the code in the first place.  
 
 
Table 2.2.3: Stock markets – Key indicators 1999, 1998 
Trading costs (basis points) 
1998 









Explicit  Market impact  Total 
France  103,0  62,4  968  22,76  7,10  29,85 
Germany  67,8  107,5  933  24,45  14,59  39,04 
USA*  181,8  123,5  7651  13,36  17,53  30,89 
*Trading costs refer to NYSE 
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3  The bright and dark side of the euro 
Transition includes acquiring living standards of the Western models. The arrival of market 
forces in the formerly planned economies revealed the low value of the then existing capital 
stock. Thus the accumulation of capital in productive investments is a necessary condition to 
increase productivity, incomes, and prosperity. Hence, quantity and quality do matter. Capital is 
supplied by domestic savings—ie, waiving of consumption—and by net imports of foreign 
resources. Given the low capital endowment in most CEEC, investment opportunities should be 
aplenty—ie, the demand for capital or the real interest rates investors are willing to pay should be 
quite high. However, the interest rate may be not a sufficient tool to allocate funds to the most 
profitable investment, because very risky projects, even with a negative net present value, might 
be able to pay higher interest rates, but only pay in favourable conditions—if not they go bust 
with little or no payment to lenders. Less risky projects are more likely to have a positive net 
present value, but might even in good states of nature not be able to afford rocketing interest 
rates. Thus a prudent and sophisticated financial system is needed to distinguish between risky 
and less risky projects. Without such a system lenders ration credit and tightening financial 
condition might stall economic growth. 
Financial markets in CEE share some disadvantages: They are very small, indeed; even the 
biggest markets in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic come only close to half of the 
German size in terms of stock market capitalisation and provided credit. And that is in relation to 
GDP (see table 3.1). In absolute terms—which are arguably more important—these markets are 
minuscule which points to some severe difficulties in acquiring and channelling funds efficiently 
as—again—economies of scale play a crucial role. Moreover, the institutional framework has not 
yet levelled with mature economies, in particular with regard to the enforcement of legal and 
business norms. The ability of the financial system to tell good from bad investments is less 
developed which increases the chances of imbalances and asset-price bubbles. Foreign financial 
institutions consequently take over a majority of the CEE market but have to experience some 
resistance in terms of political and public opposition.  
 
Countries in CEE want to gain prosperity and maintain economic and social stability at the same 
time. Transition may create a trade-off between these goals. A consequent open-market approach 
would improve long-term economic growth, however, short-term destabilisation and a strain on 
social cohesion might be a side-effect. With regard to capital market this dilemma can be 
exemplified with the rigor of capital account liberalisation. The removal of barriers to capital 
mobility increases in general quantity (see table 3.1.1) and quality of investments, as net capital 
inflows are combined with a transfer of know-how, technology and management skills. The   15
restructuring process from a planned economy toward markets will be fostered. However, 
restructuring may be painful, because production factors might not be easily transferable to new 
usages. This affects sunk costs in old industries—ie, now redundant machines and property—but 
in particular employees in these sectors, who have to burden the cost of adapting to new jobs and 
might lobby in favour of policies to reduce this burden. Moreover, the restructuring might reduce 
economic activity and increase volatility in the short-term.  
The success of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone depends on the developments on 
several levels of the capital market. Capital account liberalisation and the prospect of monetary 
stability lure considerable amounts of money into the applicant states. The sustainability of these 
flows depends on the quality of investments chosen, which in turns depends on the allocation 
abilities of the financial system. Apart from the intrusion of foreign intermediaries, institutions 
play a crucial role, especially the guarantee of long-term property rights, including a sufficient 
corporate governance. Deficits on one of these levels might cause instability which eventually 
might lead to a sudden reversal of foreign money out of CEE. Hence, the following three 




Table 3.1: Overview—financial markets in CEE 
 
2000  Bulgaria 
Czech 
Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia Lithuania  Poland 
Domestic credit provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP) 
18,29  57,28  40,01  53,95  24,22  14,44  37,83 
Financing from abroad (% of GDP) 
  -1,69  0,04  -0,06  1,53  -0,26  1,93  0,04 
Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of gross capital 
formation) 
50,44  30,42  30,21  12,12  21,02  16,17  22,35 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual 
%)  10,32  3,9  4,03  9,79  2,65  1,01  10,13 
Interest rate spread (lending rate 
minus deposit rate) 
 
8,42  3,74  3,86  2,97  7,49  8,29  5,83 
Market capitalization of listed 
companies (% of GDP)  5,15  21,67  37,15  26,34  7,88  14,03  19,83 
Short-term debt (% of total external 
debt)  4,21  42,34  28,78  14,12  37,58  22,95  11,18 
Stocks traded, total value (% of 
GDP)  0,48  12,96  6,57  26,63  3,19  1,79  9,28 
   16
2000  Romania 
Slovak 
Republic  Slovenia  Germany  United States 
14,13  59,85  47,12  147,54  161,72  Domestic credit provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP)           
------  3,17  1,73  ------  0,52  Financing from abroad (% of GDP) 
           
14,36  35,67  3,48  44,55  ------  Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of gross capital formation) 
           
45,67  12,04  10,85  1,95  3,38  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
           
------  6,44  5,72  6,23  ------  Interest rate spread (lending rate 
minus deposit rate)           
2,91  3,88  14,05  67,82  153,54  Market capitalization of listed 
companies (% of GDP)           
3,53  12,24  ------  ------  ------  Short-term debt (% of total external 
debt)           
0,64  4,68  2,56  57,08  323,89  Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 
           
 
World Development Indicators 2002 
 
 
3.1  Capital flows vs destabilisation 
All transition countries, except Bulgaria, in central and eastern Europe, which have applied for 
EU membership run investment quotas higher than in most mature economies. And all of them 
import considerable amounts of foreign capital: 
 
 




Current account deficit 
 
  In percent GDP 
Bulgaria  16,4  5,5 
Czech Republic  32,6  3,5 
Estonia  25,4  6,9 
Hungary  23,2  3,4 
Latvia  20,1  9,9 
Lithuania  22,5  6 
Poland  25,3  7,1 
Romania  20,2  4,9 
Slovenia  26,9  2,6 
Slovak Republic  40,8  3,3 
EBRD (2000)   17
 
In principle this is a benign situation: Considerable investments quotas, most of them higher than 
the usual 20 percent prevalent in Western Europe, can be financed without sacrificing private 
consumption. However, what happens if for whatever reason these flows do not sustain? A 
sudden reversal of capital flows may trigger financial and currency crises as seen in Mexico 1994, 
East Asia 1997, or Argentine 2002 for that matter.  
A wealth of literature has described the detrimental effects of a sudden outflow of capital. The 
financial system, and in particular the banking industry, is the vulnerable part. A common 
argument goes like this: The loss of foreign capital deprives local banks of financial resources and 
exposes their currency and maturity mismatch. Banks react by reducing credit, thereby worsening 
the financial conditions of the private sector. A credit crunch translates into shrinking profits and 
rising numbers of company failures, which in turn worsen banks’ assets again. Either by 
depreciating loan values (non performing loans) or collapsing values of private sector investments 
such as shareholdings. The mechanism reinforces itself and may lead to a vicious cycle and to 
financial crisis (cf Mishkin 1998).  
The magnitude of this threat is determined by the probability of a turnaround of flows as well as 
by the associated costs. A reversal of capital flows shares some commonalities with a bank run; in 
both cases a lack of collective action may magnify an in the first place minor cause of concern. 
For instance a temporary liquidity problem of a bank can lead to a bank run that deprives 
remaining resources and threatens the solvency (the seminal model is Diamond and Dybvig 1984, 
cf. Radelet and Sachs 1998). However, whole economies cannot be directly compared with banks. 
But international investors may be as capricious as banks’ depositors, in particular when the costs 
of repatriating their money are low and the overall economic conditions becomes at least unclear. 
A typical p roblem is the build-up of bubbles—ie, overinvestments in certain assets that are 
mainly reasoned by the expectation of strong investment into this specific asset in the future. The 
asset itself is rather arbitrary, be it Dutch tulips or Malaysian real estate. When the bubble bursts, 
asset prices may not only return to the whatever fair value, but undershoot this level 
considerably, because investors flee the market. Without sustained funding even profitable 
project in the first place will eventually go bust. Hence, overreactions in both directions harm the 
economy. The better a financial market is developed the less likely will be an asset price bubble—
though the dotcom-bubble shows that even the presumably highest developed markets are not 
immune. Now, overinvestment must not necessarily lead to an asset-price bubble, but anyhow it 
distorts the allocation abilities of the capital market and increases the probability of a sudden 
removal of funds.   18
Growth attracts foreign money—ie, those CEEC with higher growth rates experienced higher 
capital imports—or is it the other way round? Growth creates investment opportunities which 
can be met by funds from abroad. Increased investments may translate into higher growth. 
 
Figure 3.1.1: Growth and capital account 
GDP growth rates and capital account/GDP 






































Source: EBRD (2001) 
 
Figure 3.1.1 illustrates the point: growth is associated with higher rates of capital import. That 
may create an argument for pro-cyclical capital flows—ie, growth is complemented and pushed 
further by foreign investment (and vice versa), whereas the other way round, a loss of either 
growth or foreign capital might be aggravated by an additional loss of the other.   
The literature on capital account comes up with a positive outlook as long as the institutional 
setting is sufficiently developed and macroeconomic stability is sustained (for a survey cf IMF 
2001). There is a good chance that this will be the case in CEE, because liberalisation is 
embedded in a process of European integration, which provides the institutional framework to 
attach—the acquis—as well as macroeconomic austerity—for instance, in the form of the 
Stability Pact. 
However, the problem must not necessarily be with the CEE applicants. Figure 3.1.2 shows that 
the amounts of foreign loans provided by the banking system is rather unevenly distributed—for 
instance German banks lend more than $27bn, much more than French or US banks. A German   19
credit crunch could thus easily translate into tightening financing conditions for the CEEC 
initiating the process described above. 
 
Figure 3.1.2 
Consolidated International Claims of Reporting Banks to 
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Source: BIS 2002 
 
Capital inflows are an inevitable source for domestic investment—barring any substantial capital 
controls more than already in place to discourage a too strong short-term bias. To make the best 
out of them, the CEEC should seek to improve the allocation abilities of their financial markets. 
The less money is channelled into unsustainable investments the less likely (or necessary) will be 
financial distress or crisis. CEE applicants should welcome foreign expertise in telling apart those 
from profitable ones—ie, allow foreign entry (see next section). And they should be particularly 
careful not to create room for bubbles themselves—for instance in the form of public guarantees 
which might induce moral hazard.  
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3.2   Foreign entry vs lending discrimination 
The previous part suggested that the success of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone 
depends strongly on the financial system’s ability to cope with increasing but volatile capital 
imports. The financial system itself is shaped by the stream of foreign money if only because part 
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In the early 90s the total number of banks exploded in most CEEC. Planned economies have 
been traditionally under-banked, hence this surge may be a sign of catching-up with mature 
economies’ levels of financial services. However, the number of new banks might have overshot 
and exceeded demand which may explain the shrinking numbers starting in 1995. On the other 
hand, financial sectors in most countries have consolidated as international competition grew and 
the realisation of economies of scale has become more and more important to guarantee survival, 
hence declining numbers of banks may indicate an increasing integration into an international 
capital market.  
Foreign ownership is on the rise. Soon, every second bank in CEE will be foreign owned. 
However, national differences p ersist: Some of the CEEC showed more enthusiasm toward 
foreign owners, whereas others have been rather reluctant—for instance in Slovenia, one of the 








































advanced applicant states, only 5 out of 31 banks have foreign owners (numbers for 1999, EBRD 
2000).  
Foreign banks that enter emerging markets generally have lower interest rate margins and 
overhead expenses but higher profits than domestic banks, indicating their superior 
competitiveness. This improves the functioning of capital market and is supposed to have 
positive welfare effects, at least in the long run (Claessens et al., 2001b). Foreign banks (i) 
improve quality and availability of financial services by increasing bank competition and enabling 
greater application of modern banking skills and technology, (ii) serve to stimulate the 
development of bank supervisory and legal framework, and (iii) enhance a country's access to 
international capital (Levine, 1996). These beneficiary effects are supported by a number of 
studies, such as Levine (1996), Walter and Gray (1983), Goldberg and Saunders (1981), and Gelb 
and Sagari (1990).  
If it is true that foreign financial institutions improve market efficiency then there are 
nevertheless a couple of associated risks to consider. First, foreigners may lack public acceptance 
which might prevent governments to sell financial institutions abroad. This feeling is not limited 
to Eastern Europe but can be found throughout the world—for instance, French authorities did 
not allow to let ailing Crédit Lyonnais fall into hands of Deutsche, Germany’s biggest bank (The 
Economist 1999). Banks and financial institutions are an important feature of the economic 
cycle, losing control over it is seen as losing national sovereignty in that respect. Moreover, 
having such an integral part of the economy being taken-over by foreigners may seem as 
disqualifying domestic talents and capabilities which might be hard and unpleasant to accept. A 
similar fear can be observed with regard to the tradability of land. Real estate is a non-negligible 
asset as investment and arguably even more important as collateral for credit. Limiting the 
purchase of land is a strong impediment for investors, and all CEEC, except Estonia and 
Lithuania, have restriction on tradability of land for foreigners in place, either de jure or de facto 
(EBRD 2000). Land is burdened with emotion like banks are: Slovenians cherish their small 
Adria coastline (Lavrac 2002), and do not  want to forgo it into foreign hands. Poles are more 
precise and especially dislike the vision of Germans buying considerable parts of the countryside.  
However, there are some reasons behind these arguments than just sentiment, and many flaws. 
The EMU of 1999 has created a European capital market, enhanced competition, and improved 
efficiency. Now, financial institutions play on a European level which led to considerable changes 
and consolidation (for a more detailed description see the background paper on Benelux, France, 
and Germany). The Western European financial industry has in many points advantages over 
their CEE counterparts, mainly their superior financial technologies and access to capital. Their 
disadvantage is that they are less informed about regional particularities, with regard to   22
governments, institutions, firms, and customers. If a very big part of the financial system is 
replaced by foreign players, then this specific knowledge might get lost. Small and medium sized 
firms (SME) seem to be mostly affected. Bank loans are usually the only access to external 
capital, except for private investors, but most other means such as shares and bonds are not cost 
efficient. Moreover, SME financing is traditionally risky, has small margins, and hence, promises 
only little profit. Assessing the economic and financial condition of SME requires detailed 
knowledge about the business environment and the firm itself; something that is often acquired 
only in a long-term relation between bank and customer: A relation often dubbed as arm’s length 
lending. SME may suffer in two ways: Either domestically owned banks disappear, or 
competition with foreign competitors forces them out of any low profit business, which SME 
lending often is (cf Agénor 2001, or Stiglitz 1993). But this must not necessarily be so. 
International competition might render SME lending the only remaining resort for domestic 
banks; new banking skills and technologies might improve the profitability of SME lending and 
let foreign banks enter this business; by the same token, improved access to capital might turn 
SME lending more attractive, and so forth. Hence, some recent evidence suggests that lending 
conditions for SME even improve under foreign entry (cf Clarke et al. 2001a,b).  
 
Financial markets in CEE are rather small compared to EU standards. European consolidation 
will create fewer b ut bigger financial institutions, and most of them will come from mature 
economies, given their superior market (and marketing) power. However, even a medium-sized 
player on a European level will be big enough to dominate a national market in an applicant state. 
If integration into a European capital market falls short of the creation of a dominant financial 
actor, than the result may be de facto a monopoly with the usual adverse concomitants (cf 
Agénor 2001). Moreover, in times of distress, foreign banks might “cut and run”—ie, retreat 
from the problematic market, leaving the country with an incomplete financial industry (again cf 
Agénor 2001). Hence, the reluctance of many CEE politicians to allow foreign banks to acquire 
controlling stakes in domestic financial institutions. But banks and financial markets are also 
often used as policy-instruments; again a phenomenon not limited to CEEC. Politicians try to 
keep as much control as possible—for instance in order to pursue development objectives. A 
domestic bank may be asked to lend to ailing firms, albeit economic sense tells otherwise, in 
order to safe jobs or to guarantee support for the next election campaign. International firms 
seem less dependent, and thus, less subject to a comparable holdup. The distrust of foreign banks 
extends consequently to a distrust of private ownership of banks at all: In many CEEC state-
owned banks still have an asset share of more than 20 to 40 percent (EBRD 2000), albeit these 
shares are not too scary, given that for instance half the German banking sector is public-owned.   23
However, the track-record of governmental intervention is rather mixed, to say the least. For 
instance, La Porta et al. (2002) show that countries with higher government ownership in banks 
usually suffer from lower growth rates. With regard to the CEEC this relation is not self-evident. 
Slovenia, one of the most successful applicants has an asset share of state-owned banks of more 
than 40 percent, but so have rather less fortunate Romania and Bulgaria (EBRD 2000).  
 
Since the mid-90s foreign banks have gained more and more importance in the applicant states. 
Whatever the associated resentments, financial markets have improved during that period. 
Domestic credit to enterprises (in percent GDP) has increased or has been stable with figures 
from 10 to more than 40 percent. Only the Czech Republic observed a considerable decline from 
48 to 44 percent after the 1997 currency crisis, albeit it still has the highest level (EBRD 2000).  
But the Czech Republic also has a high share of non-performing loans in relation to total loans 
with more than 30 percent, again raising after 1997, only surpassed by Romania (37 percent) and 
the Slovak Republic (40 percent).  But the general picture is rather positive. The same holds for 
other indicators such as the EBRD index of banking sector reform and the EBRD index of 
reform of non-banking financial institutions. Foreign entry has improved market efficiency and 
further progress can be expected.  
The question whether or not foreign ownership is welcome will not be posed, because the acquis 
communautaire does not allow any restrictions that violate the internal market, in particular the 
freedom of capital. Hence, it will be important to manage the financial integration and 
consolidation. The most important lesson might be to ensure diversity—ie, to prevent being 
dominated by few major players. The most viable way to do so, seems to pursue the integration 
into the European capital market, where huge domestic financial institution (foreign owned or 
not) shrink to one of many fish in a bowl.  
 
 
3.3  Institutional development  
Institutions do matter. Markets develop their full potential only when appropriate rules are in 
place which hinder or limit detrimental behaviour of market participants. Transaction costs rise 
when rules and framing institutions are missing, making especially those transaction unprofitable 
that require high institutional standards. Ordinary spot transactions, such as buying a 
standardised good, can be easily monitored and enforced and thus require only few institutional 
prerequisites. The more monitoring and enforcement become problematic, for instance because 
the transaction comprises deals now and in the future, the higher standards are needed or the 
higher transaction costs rise respectively.    24
Financial transactions are among the most demanding contracts. Even common credit and loan 
relations have several distinct points of execution, such as the initial transfer to the debtor and 
the following interest and repayments. More advanced contracts do not specify the due amount 
but have some residual claims like stocks, where dividends are paid as a share of profit less 
interest. Any investment now relies on the expectation that the counter-party is willing and able 
to fulfil its commitment in the future. Trust is needed, and trust grows the stronger and reliable 
institutions are.  
Capital markets basically suffer from three variants of contract problems: (i) Ex ante, the price 
might not reflect the fair value of the asset—for instance, the interest rate charged might not 
sufficiently reflect default risk. Moreover, a raising interest rate may drive good risks out of the 
market and hence worsen the pool of remaining risks with a loss in total return (cf Akerlof 1970, 
Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). (ii) Ex post, contract-parties may change their behaviour—eg, the 
manager of a firm which has firstly issued stocks, might turn away from value-maximisation in 
favour of perquisite consumption and asset-stripping. The loss in firm value is often dubbed as 
agency cost (cf. Berle and Means 1932, Fama 1980). (iii) Again ex post, contract-parties may 
renegotiate the terms of the deal and may get away with it, given that the other party has little 
outside options—ie, the deal has a high degree of specificity (cf Williamson 1985, Blanchard and 
Kremer 1997). Institutions have evolved to reduce the potential of (i)-(iii). There are laws and 
regulation that require to report truthfully and to comply with contract terms; norms and values 
structure behaviour that is not subject to legal action, and contract-parties may find it to be in 
their own interest to behave honest and trustworthy, if only to gain reputation and other 
favourable signals for future business (cf Williamson 2000).  
Most CEEC have by now adopted commercial law and regulation quite similar to that of mature 
economies. In fact, some just transferred the respective codes to new grounds. But there is still a 
significant discrepancy between law on the books and its effectiveness. A glance at the EBRD's 
transition indicators may be illuminating. It may be true that financial transition indicators may be 
high in general, though, with regard to securities markets and non-bank financial institutions—ie, 
the more advanced parts of a financial system—these indicators are lower, on average two 
notches (EBRD, 2000). Moreover, with regard to the legal framework—ie, commercial law and 
financial regulation—it is important to note that there is still a difference between extensiveness 
and effectiveness according to the respective indicators, extensiveness being ranked usually 0 to 3 
notches higher than effectiveness (EBRD, 2000). Enforcement of rules seem to be the crucial 
ingredient of capital market development.  
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A glance on the institutional development is allowed by the calculation of the CIM indicator 
(contract-intensive money) as proposed by Clague et al (1999). Figure 3.3.1 displays the CIM for 






Joining EMU affects the institutional framework in multiple ways: The acquis includes a wealth 
of laws and regulation that has to be adopted by the prospective members. The European 
Commission will monitor if these are only adopted on the book or put effectively into practise. 
By the same token will financial markets monitor these efforts and will reward success by lower 
real interest rates. Failure to improve the institutional framework would mean constant perhaps 
even higher real interest rates which might lead to a violation of the Maastricht convergence 
condition on long term interest rates. Thus, the incentive to enforce an appropriate institutional 
framework is strengthened.    
Whenever institutions are discussed the role of the state in providing these is often emphasised. 
With regard to features such as laws, regulation, supervision, and legal system this pronounced 
position is evident. Why then is the enforcement of certain institutions still a problem? The usual 
responses include arguments that highlight the legal tradition, respectively that it takes time for  
International Monetary Fund 2001, own calculations 
 
The CIM calculates the ratio between contract-intensive forms of money—ie, non currency 
money—and total money supply. Non-currency money is estimated with a broad M2 definition 
and total money as currency held outside banks. The CIM is used as a proxy for institutional 
quality, because longer-term commitment, such as savings deposits, are only accepted when 
people feel that their property rights are respected. Without trust, they would hold only very 
short-term assets or cash, including foreign currency. Hence, the higher the CIM the more 
contract-intensive forms of money are used in relation to total money supply, and hence, the 
more confidence in the financial system and its institutions can be seen. The average CIM for the 
CEEC (not weighted) amounts to 0.8 as opposed to 0.9 in Germany. However, the regional 
dispersion is quite interesting, albeit data comparability and quality is certainly a caveat. The Baltic 
states score lowest; only Estonia shows a remarkable increase starting in 1995. Bulgaria exhibits 
the sharpest fall, whereas Romania managed a considerable increase, though from a low level. 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic have similar and above values than Germany (see figure 3.3.1).  
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Joining EMU affects the institutional framework in multiple ways: The acquis includes a wealth 
of laws and regulation that has to be adopted by the prospective members. The European 
Commission will monitor if these are only adopted on the book or put effectively into practise. 
By the same token, financial markets will monitor these efforts and will reward success by lower 
real interest rates. Failure to improve the institutional framework would mean constant perhaps 
even higher real interest rates which might lead to a violation of the Maastricht convergence 
condition on long term interest rates. Thus, the incentive to enforce an appropriate institutional 
framework is strengthened.    
Whenever institutions are discussed the role of the state in providing these is often emphasised. 
With regard to features such as laws, regulation, supervision, and legal system this pronounced 
position is evident. Why then is the enforcement of certain institutions still a problem? The usual 
responses include arguments that highlight the legal tradition, respectively that it takes time for 
new institutions to evolve, or argue that it might not be in the interest of politicians to change the 
status quo because private benefits more than compensate for the loss in welfare. True as they 
are, these answers seem not entirely convincing. The involvement of the private sector may be 
the missing link. 
The state is not the only one to put institutions into practise. An appropriate law might be in 
place as well as trained judges and lawyers; however, it still requires a plaintiff. If trails are 
cumbersome and time and money consuming, private parties might abstain from suing even if 
chances to win are high. Moreover, they might abstain from business that might require the 
enforcement of claims via the courts. But in particular with respect to rather vague institutions 
such as norms, values, and ethical behaviour, private enforcement is crucial. Cheating during a 
deal might not be legally traceable—or the costs of doing so are prohibitively high—but impairs 
future business.  
With the promise of the euro in the applicant states, foreign investors are attracted by monetary 
stability and profitable investment opportunities. They may also change the way institutions are 
enforced. Foreign investors have presumably less possibilities for private benefits—ie, they 
require fair and honest transactions more than domestic investors do. Note, we all are only in it 
for the money, but the average foreign investor, given the lack of a domestic network, might 
maximise its profit under developed financial and legal institutions. Moreover, big international 
and institutional investors might take legal actions even if they do not pay off as a stand alone 
project. But their size and time horizon allows them to internalise the positive external effect in 
the form of an improved legal (enforcement) system.  
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EMU will integrate the applicants in CEE into a European capital market where a certain set of 
formal and informal rules apply. The acquis requires the fulfilment of the formal side, whereas 
market participants enforce formal and informal rules. Of course, international investors will try 
to exploit institutional deficiencies in the same way as locals, but they might have less scope to do 
so compared to domestic incumbents, with their established connections and networks. It will be 
important to keep pace with this development in order to ensure that internationals work to 
support the institutional setting instead of exploiting it. 
 
4  Conclusions – don’t fight it 
Capital markets in Europe are changing toward a more open-market approach, and so are the 
capital markets in the CEE applicant states, albeit they are still in process of transition. An open-
market solution is generally regarded as the more efficient solution in terms of allocation and 
corporate governance, but might also increase financial volatility. Institutional quality, such as the 
guarantee of property rights, sufficient competition, and so forth, plus macroeconomic stability 
are necessary to mitigate volatility.  
Eastward enlargement of the European Union includes the CEE applicants to this development. 
The adoption of the euro promises monetary stability, the accompanying mandatory conditions 
require fiscal austerity and an institutional upgrade to western European levels. In that sense will 
the arrival of the euro strengthen the process toward markets and accommodate it by providing 
institutional quality and macroeconomic stability.  
The downside might be that any deviations from this train would become more costly. A very 
early reliance on markets and deregulated banking might not suit the transition economies which, 
due to their volatile economic development, might prefer a more interventionist stance.  
Exuberances and downward spirals are sometimes part of financial markets. Apparently small 
causes might trigger destabilising capital flows which increase economic volatility. CEE 
applicants are in particular exposed to foreign funds, and it will be important that potential 
triggers from the financial system or corporate sector will be suppressed.  
A financial crises would hurt the CEEC anyway, but the euro somehow increases the bets: The 
euro raises expectations in the form of macroeconomic, monetary, and institutional stability, 
which fuel optimism and capital inflows. This enthusiasm might easily overshoot. However, if the 
high hopes would be disappointed or adjusted to reality, enthusiasm might turn sour and capital 
flows might even undershoot a long-term level and cutting the CEE applicants of financial 
resources. The euro improves access to international capital at lower cost and facilitates 
integration into the European financial market, however, failure to keep pace with this 
development might also incur much higher cost, which is the very logic of this process.    28
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